RFK Jr.’s Big Bird Flu Gamble: Remedy or Catastrophe?

Scientists say he’s flirting with disaster, but he’s betting on a hidden immunity edge.

Image: Joshua Sukoff | Shutterstock

This article originally appeared on Trial Site News and was republished with permission.

Does Robert F. Kennedy (RFK) Jr., Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS) simply want to let the bird flu tear through poultry farms across America with no real intervention? This is what much of the mainstream media is now declaring such as Scientific American. According to "RFK, Jr. Wants to Let Bird Flu Spread on Poultry Farms. Why Experts Are Concerned," Stephanie Pappas, edited by Jeanna Bryner, scrutinizes RFK Jr’s purported proposal to allow the H5N1 avian influenza to run its course among poultry.

Kennedy suggests that permitting the virus to spread would enable farmers to identify and breed birds with natural immunity, a very different approach.

However, experts vehemently oppose this notion, labeling it as perilous and impractical. Does the RFK Jr suggestion make sense, or have the chance of working in an industrialized system of poultry production?

Rocio Crespo, a poultry veterinarian at North Carolina State University, dismisses the idea outright, stating, "No, not for this disease. This is crazy." The mainstream scientific media’s article elucidates that the highly pathogenic avian influenza is devastatingly lethal, annihilating 90 to 100 percent of infected chickens within three to four days, thereby precluding any chance for the development of immunity.

Consequently, the current protocol mandates the culling of infected flocks to contain the outbreak, a strategy Ms. Pappas suggests is underpinned by scientific evidence.

Does the narrative present a balanced view by incorporating expert opinions that highlight the fallacies in Kennedy's proposal, thereby maintaining objectivity? The article certainly conveys subtly the gravity of the situation and the potential repercussions of adopting such an approach, reflecting a cautious stance against the proposed strategy. But did the group speak with the HHS Secretary or spokesperson for their perspective?

They did not but rather point to a Fox News entry where RFK Jr. suggests by letting the highly pathogenic bird flu disseminate via flocks, farmers could “identify the birds, and preserve the birds, which are immune to it.”

However, the Scientific American piece points out that poultry experts convey this could lead to an “unimaginable poultry death toll.”

Kristina Fiore’s MedPage Today report attempts to dismantle the HHS Secretary’s claims about the H5N1 bird flu, exposing supposed fundamental scientific inaccuracies in his statements.

For example, Kennedy asserts that the dominant U.S. strain, B3.13, poses no real danger to humans, but infectious disease experts counter that any H5N1 strain has the potential to reassort with other influenza viruses, increasing its transmissibility and lethality. Dr. James Lawler of the University of Nebraska Medical Center warns that B3.13 shares characteristics with historically deadly H5N1 strains and has already hospitalized people.

The MedPage Today piece accuses Kennedy of misrepresenting avian immunity, claiming wild birds have natural resistance. Experts clarify that while some earlier strains had a lower impact, the current H5N1 variant has caused mass die-offs among wild bird populations, threatening species with extinction, which certainly would be a big problem.

Challenging Kennedy’s position on poultry vaccination, the author highlights that economic trade concerns—not scientific fears of viral mutation—drive resistance to vaccinating flocks. In fact, vaccination programs in countries like China have successfully reduced transmission. Yet a fact check by TrialSite suggests mounting evidence does at least potentially support RFK Jr’s argument about viral mutation. For example, see “TrialSite’s “Double-Edge Sword of Mass Bird Vaccination—Link with Interspecies Transmission & Molecular Evolution of Bird Flu.” Clearly, the MedPage Today reporter is taking a comprehensive and imminent evidentiary viewpoint.

That Kennedy wants to test antivirals en masse in poultry and let the virus "run through" flocks to breed immunity amounts to blasphemy. However, as writer Laura Mueller suggests in TrialSite a broader paradigm shift may be necessary to transcend the current crises. Large, industrialized poultry production may be part of the problem.

The majority of “experts” according to MedPage Today argue that the proposed RFK Jr approach would accelerate viral mutation, increase the likelihood of resistance to antiviral drugs, and heighten the risk of human transmission.

Experts interviewed such as James Lawler, MD, MPH, of the University of Nebraska Medical Center's Global Center for Health Security in Omaha, went on the record that we "don't know nearly enough about B3.13, or D1.1 for that matter, to make definitive statements about danger in humans." The University of Nebraska’s center also expressed concern about the Kennedy direction.

In a borderline ad hominem attack, Lawler dismisses Kennedy’s plan as “Hollywood science, not real science.” But is this the right way to work through this crisis? Could not RFK Jr. be on to some fundamental underlying problems that need more innovative, out-of-the-box thinking to overcome? Is the time for dialogue over? Warning that every additional animal infection is a roll of the evolutionary dice that could push H5N1 closer to a catastrophic pandemic.

RFK Jr. must walk a fine line, given the near religious-like topic vaccination brings in American society against some of the challenges with mass vaccination that inevitably occur with mass inducement of immune system responses. There will always be some percentage of adverse side effects to account for.

RFK Jr. navigates a delicate balance, as vaccination remains a near-religious issue in American society. While mass vaccination triggers immune responses that protect populations, it inevitably comes with some adverse effects that must be acknowledged and managed.

According to Dr. Peter McCullough in a recent interview published on his Substack, the most recent clade D.1.1 looks far more dangerous given recent deaths in the U.S. and Cambodia and he suggests the outbreak has gone too long due to countermeasure killing flocks due to a “counterproductive biosecurity” strategy. All the flocks are killed which allows fresh infection, all the while affording too much time “for genetic misadventure.”

It would appear Dr. McCullough has the ear of RFK Jr., as the cardiologist's point of view has gained momentum at high levels of the HHS. According to Dr. McCullough, “The typical bird flu outbreak lasts a few days to a few weeks for each chicken house and if the contagion is widespread this crisis could be in the news for a few years. Most birds with H5N1 will recover because they are genetically and nutritionally robust to survive the infection. When they breed, the next generation will be relatively resistant to infection and transmission of the virus. This is called “hardiness” and is commonly applied to plants as described by the National Wildlife Federation.”

McCullough continues:

“Ecological hardiness, in the context of plants, refers to their ability to survive and thrive under various challenging environmental conditions, including climate, soil, and other ecological factors, and is often measured by their tolerance to temperature extremes, drought, or other stressors.”

He continues:

“By culling or mass destruction of healthy flocks after one pooled H5N1 PCR is positive, fresh susceptible flocks are re-introduced to the infection carried by migratory waterfowl and the outbreak is propagated, not curtailed.”

However, Dr. McCullough’s argument that poultry can develop genetic "hardiness" to H5N1 may overlook key biological realities. Unlike plants, which evolve resistance to environmental stressors over generations, poultry face an aggressive, rapidly mutating virus that kills up to 100% of infected birds within days. Is there a meaningful opportunity for natural selection to favor resistant birds when the vast majority die before passing on their genes?

Plus, experts may counter that allowing the virus to spread unchecked invites greater viral reassortment, increasing the likelihood of dangerous mutations that could enable human-to-human transmission.

The claim that ending culling would shorten the outbreak according to some experts contradicts historical evidence according to some points of view. For example, critics would argue past avian flu outbreaks have only been contained through strict biosecurity measures, not through passive exposure according to what is probably the dominant vantage.

While Dr. McCullough argues that current policies create a cycle of reinfection, halting biosecurity efforts would likely accelerate the emergence of a more virulent strain—turning a poultry problem into a broader public health crisis.

Is it the case that McCullough’s suggestion appears as a different kind of biosecurity option that in smaller more regionalized production could possibly make more sense than in vast industrialized operations? And this gets back to Mueller’s March 15th article in TrialSite and the need to reconsider our poultry production processes and assets, which could infringe on market dynamics.

What do you think?

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